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INTRODUCTION
Most Americans can probably hum a few bars of the theme song
to one of television's most successful franchises: Law & Order.'
Watching the ever-cynical Detective Briscoe investigate crimes
alongside the good-looking Detective Logan made viewers root for
police to catch New York City's criminals. Sometimes the "bad guys"
won, such as when the judge excluded the smoking gun from trial,
introducing Americans to some of the costs to the criminal justice
system in preserving defendants' rights. As much as society hates
seeing a criminal go free, maintaining a defendant's rights before and
during trial is integral to the American justice system. In passing the
DNA Database Act of 2010,2 the North Carolina General Assembly
has reduced the costs for law enforcement and prosecutors to obtain a
conviction but increased costs for the civil liberties of criminal
defendants who have not yet been tried by a jury of their peers. At
first blush, one might wonder, "What is wrong with using DNA
samples to close cold cases and close fresh ones even faster?"' The
problem lies in trampling arrested individuals' civil rights in the
footrace to a conviction.
This Recent Development will argue that collecting an arrestee's
DNA under the DNA Database Act without a search warrant
violates the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable
searches. In Part I, this Recent Development will discuss the passage
of the DNA Database Act and the statute itself. Part II will establish
that a cheek swab of an arrested individual is a search. Since
* 0 2011 Lauren N. Hobson.
1. Law & Order (NBC television broadcast 1990-2010). DNA database laws were
recently featured on Law & Order: Los Angeles. Law & Order: Los Angeles: Ballona
Creek (NBC television broadcast Nov. 17, 2010).
2. DNA Database Act of 2010, ch. 94, 2010-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1 (LexisNexis)
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-266.3A (Supp. 2010)). This law became effective on
February 1, 2011. Id. at 9.
3. Raleigh chief of police Harry Patrick Dolan argued that North Carolina Board of
Education member Kathy Taft's murder could have been closed in seven days, rather than
the forty-one it actually took to close the case, had the police been able to take advantage
of the new law. Thomasi McDonald, Cooper Argues for Taking DNA, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 29, 2010, at 3B, available at http://www.newsobserver
.com/2010/06/29/556360/cooper-argues-for-taking-dna.html #storylink=misearch.
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"[s]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions,"' Part III will demonstrate that none
of the "well-delineated exceptions,"'-including search incident to
lawful arrest, inventory search, or exigent circumstances-justify the
warrantless search. Furthermore, as discussed in Part IV, at least two
state courts differ in their treatment of this issue, and the Minnesota
Court of Appeals' invalidation of a statute6 analogous to North
Carolina's is instructive on the Fourth Amendment unreasonableness
of cheek swabs under such statutes. Finally, Part V will show that the
policy reasons advanced by supporters of DNA database laws are not
persuasive and that there is a less constitutionally questionable
method to achieve many of the same goals.
I. DNA DATABASE ACT OF 2010
The North Carolina General Assembly passed the DNA
Database Act on July 10, 2010, substantially amending North
Carolina's criminal procedure statutes.! Legislators, commentators,
and scholars have spoken out against the passage of this law,' and
with good reason. On the other hand, law enforcement officials and
prosecutors supported the Act, citing the possibilities of closing old
cases and exonerating innocent individuals.' North Carolina Attorney
General Roy Cooper and law enforcement officials even invoked the
highly publicized investigations into the murder of University of
North Carolina student body president Eve Carson and the murder of
4. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
5. Id.
6. In re C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484, 492 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
7. 2010-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1. Governor Beverly E. Perdue signed the bill into
law on July 15, 2010. Id. at 9.
8. See Daren Bakst & Sarah Preston, Editorial, Don't Let the State Take Arrestees'
DNA, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 17, 2010, at 13A, available at
http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/06/17/536558/dont-let-the-state-take-arrestees.html
#storylink=misearch (arguing that the DNA Database Act endangers the rights of the
innocent); Anne Blythe & Lynn Bonner, DNA Law Raises Legal Questions, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 29, 2010, at 1A, available at http://www.news
observer.com/2010/07/29/602467/dna-law-raises-legal-questions.html#storylink=misearch
(surveying legal commentators concerned about the constitutional implications of the act);
McDonald, supra note 3 (noting Attorney General Cooper's support for the law as well as
the critics' critiques of the law); Perdue Signs DNA Bill, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), July 15, 2010, http://www.newsobserver.com/ 2010/07/15/583005/perdue-signs-dna-
bill.html#storylink=misearch ("Opponents vigorously objected to having DNA records
from people who are presumed innocent added to the DNA database.").
9. McDonald, supra note 3.
1310 [Vol. 89
2011] N. CAROLINA'S ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT 1311
North Carolina Board of Education member Kathy Taft in their
advocacy for this law.10
The Act authorizes police to take a cheek swab to obtain a DNA
sample from anyone arrested pursuant to a valid warrant for over
fifty different criminal offenses," some of which are nonviolent.12 The
offenses include first- and second-degree murder,13 voluntary and
involuntary manslaughter,14 first-degree rape," enticing a minor out
of the state for employment,16 unlawful arrest by an officer of another
state,'7 first- and second-degree burglary,'" burning of ginhouses and
tobacco houses, 9 failure to comply with orders of public authorities,20
and cyberstalking.21 In addition, one's DNA can be collected for
10. Id. For more information about Eve Carson, see Anne Blythe & Cheryl Johnston
Sadgrove, 'Carolina, ... the Whole World Has Lost a Lot,' NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Mar. 7, 2008, at 10A, available at http://www.newsobserver.com/2008/03/07/
41509/carolina-the-whole-world-has-lost.html#storylink=misearch. For more information
about Kathy Taft, see Anne Blythe & Thomasi McDonald, Taft Is Honored as Questions
Persist, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 2, 2010, at 1B, available at
http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/04/02/417685/taft-is-honored-as-questions-persist.html
#storylink=misearch.
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-266.3A(a)-(b) (Supp. 2010). Seventeen of these criminal
offenses can be found in article 15 of chapter 14. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-58.2-69.3
(2009).
12. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-68, 14-69, 14-69.1, 14-196.3 (2009) (criminalizing
failure to comply with orders of public authorities, officers' failure to investigate an
incendiary fire, making a false bomb threat, and cyberstalking, respectively).
13. § 15A-266.3A(f)(1); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (2009) (defining first- and
second-degree murder).
14. § 15A-266.3A(f)(2); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-18 (2009) (defining voluntary
and involuntary manslaughter),
15. § 15A-266.3A(f)(3); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2 (2009) (defining first-
degree rape).
16. § 15A-266.3A(f)(5); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-40 (2009) (defining the crime of
enticing a minor out of the state for employment).
17. § 15A-266.3A(f)(5); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-43.1 (2009) (defining unlawful
arrest by another state's officer).
18. § 15A-266.3A(f)(6); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51 (2009) (defining first- and
second-degree burglary).
19. § 15A-266.3A(f)(7); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-64 (2009) (defining the burning
of ginhouses and tobacco houses).
20. § 15A-266.3A(f)(7); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-68 (2009) (defining failure to
comply with the orders of a public official).
21. § 15A-266.3A(f)(10); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-196.3 (2009) (defining
cyberstalking). For other offenses for which an arrestee's DNA can be collected, see, for
example, statutory rape, § 15A-266.3A(f)(3), felonious assault with a deadly weapon,
§ 15A-266.3A(f)(4), burning of boats and barges, § 15A-266.3A(f)(7), and officer's failure
to investigate incendiary fires, § 15A-266.3A(f)(7); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.7A
(2009) (defining statutory rape); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32 (2009) (defining felonious
assault with a deadly weapon); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-63 (2009) (defining burning of boats
and barges); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-69 (2009) (defining failure to investigate incendiary
fire).
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"attempting, solicitation of another to commit, conspiracy to commit,
or aiding and abetting another to commit" any of the enumerated
offenses. 22 The State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) will maintain the
DNA database.23 The SBI is also charged with promulgating the
procedures, safeguards, and quality standards for the database.24
Once collected, an arrestee's DNA is expunged only in a narrow
class of cases: (1) if the arrestee is acquitted; (2) if the arrestee is
convicted of a lesser included offense that is a misdemeanor and not
specifically enumerated in the statute as subject to the taking of
DNA; (3) if no charge was filed within the statute of limitations;25 or
(4) if after three years from the date of arrest no conviction occurred
and no prosecution is being actively pursued.26 An arrestee must also
show that he is not required to give a DNA sample pursuant to the
sex offender registry.2 7 For an arrestee who wishes to have his DNA
deleted prior to June 1, 2012, he must submit an expunction request,
with documentation from the Administrative Office of the Courts
(AOC), to the prosecuting attorney.28 After June 1, 2012, the district
attorney's office is to investigate and document the circumstances that
purportedly qualify the arrestee for expunction within thirty days of
the qualifying event, sign the AOC verification form, and submit the
AOC verification form to the SBI.29 Within thirty days, the SBI must
decide whether the arrestee has truly qualified for removal and notify
the arrestee of the decision.3 0 There is some opportunity for judicial
22. § 15A-266.3A(g).
23. § 15A-266.3A(e).
24. § 15A-266.3A(o). The SBI is currently under investigation for mishandling the
results of blood tests in at least 230 cases, among other alleged incidents of misconduct.
Joseph Neff & Mandy Locke, Legislators Turn Against SBI, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 6, 2010, at 1A, available at http://www.newsobserver.com/
2010/09/06/667047/legislators-turn-against-sbi.html#storylink=misearch.
25. North Carolina does not have a statute of limitations for felonies. State v.
Johnson, 275 N.C. 264, 271, 167 S.E.2d 274, 279 (1969).
26. § 15A-266.3A(h)(1). While much of this Recent Development may appear to
argue that criminals should be shielded from prosecution for their past crimes, there is a
genuine argument that the innocent will also be affected by this law. It is important to note
that the State can keep one's DNA in the database for up to three years if no active
prosecution is pending. Id. This provision allows the State to keep an innocent individual's
DNA in the database. If a close relative, such as a parent, child, or sibling, of an innocent
individual (whose DNA remains in the database despite the lack of an active prosecution)
commits a crime and leaves his own DNA on the scene, police could potentially track
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review31 of the SBI's decision or any failure to comply with the
respective thirty-day time constraints upon the district attorney's
office and SBI. 32
This law may raise other legal concerns;33 however, this Recent
Development will focus on the Fourth Amendment issues.
II. CHEEK SWABS ARE SEARCHES UNDER RELEVANT CASE LAW
The cheek swab process authorized by the Act should be deemed
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The
touchstone case for what is considered a search is Katz v. United
States. 34 Katz held that there is no Fourth Amendment protection in
"[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public."3 Justice Stewart's
majority opinion acknowledged that while a glass telephone booth
may not completely exclude "intruding eyes," it nonetheless provides
protection from the "uninvited ear."36 The Court's distinction is an
important one: the content of what Katz discussed in the phone
booth, and not his mere presence in the phone booth, was the basis of
criminal charges.37
More important than the majority's opinion is Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion setting out the mode of analysis that was adopted
31. As the statute is written, there is no explanation regarding the scope of such
review. See § 15A-266.3A(l).
32. Id.
33. For example, there may be procedural due process concerns. Has the State
afforded a sufficient process to an arrestee to protect his liberty or property interest in his
DNA if the SBI determines that he is not eligible for expunction? Since the statute
provides no guidance regarding what the scope of judicial review will be, this question
cannot yet be answered.
34. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Fourth Amendment was incorporated as against the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 26-28 (1949),
and the exclusionary rule was held to be applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 660 (1961).
35. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, The North Carolina courts have long followed the same
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as that announced by the United States Supreme
Court. State v. Pearson, 145 N.C. App. 506, 517, 551 S.E.2d 471, 478 (2001) (stating that
there is no variation between the United States Constitution and the North Carolina
Constitution as it concerns searches and seizures despite the use of different language in
the North Carolina Constitution); State v. Gwyn, 103 N.C. App. 369, 371, 406 S.E.2d 145,
146 (1991) ("North Carolina's law of search and seizure and the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States are the same."); State v.
Hendricks, 43 N.C. App. 245, 251-52, 258 S.E.2d 872, 877 (1979) ("[T]here is no variance
between the search and seizure law of North Carolina and the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States.").
36. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
37. See id. at 348-49 (detailing that Katz was charged with placing bets over the phone
and that taped conversations between Katz and others were used against him at trial).
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by subsequent Court opinions to find whether a search occurred.
Justice Harlan agreed with the majority that a search had occurred,
but he would have analyzed this issue with a two-step inquiry: first,
whether the defendant "exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy," and second, whether, when objectively considered, the
defendant's expectation was "one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable.' "39
As the majority did in Katz, one must distinguish between the
sources of DNA that are exposed and those that are shielded from
the uninvited public. A person regularly exposes her saliva,
containing DNA, when drinking, eating, or spitting. The waiter that
collects a person's drinking glass at the end of dinner may hand that
glass, and the person's DNA, over to police.40 In contrast, cheek cells
are not left behind on objects for anyone to collect. A person's cheek
cells are within the metaphorical telephone booth, a zone of
protected privacy into which police may not enter without probable
cause.4 1 Therefore, a cheek swab does not fall within the public
exposure rule for which there is no Fourth Amendment protection
under Katz.42
Additionally, language from United States v. Dionisio43 helps to
distinguish characteristics that the Court has held to be exposed to
the public.
The physical characteristics of a person's voice, its tone and
manner, as opposed to the content of a specific conversation,
are constantly exposed to the public. Like a man's facial
characteristics, or handwriting, his voice is repeatedly produced
38. See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629-33 (2010) (discussing
whether plaintiff police officer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text
messages sent from his department-issued cell phone); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
740 (1979) ("Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that the application of
the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim
a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' that has been invaded
by government action."); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) ("[T]he Court in Katz
held that capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends ... upon
whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the invaded place.").
39. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
40. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 42 (1988) (holding that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage that is abandoned by the roadside for
collection).
41. "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
42. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
43. 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
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for others to hear. No person can have a reasonable expectation
that others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than
he can reasonably expect that his face will be a mystery to the
world."
Unlike a face or voice, cheek cells containing DNA are not
exposed to the public for the average person to recognize their
characteristics. One can easily recognize a parent's face or a friend's
voice without any technological assistance. Even fingerprints can be
identified with the aid of a magnifying glass, whereas DNA requires
more advanced technology. Taking into account this divergence from
other physical characteristics, a cheek swab should be considered a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.4 5
Despite the arguable difference in level of technology required,
several courts have analogized the process of fingerprinting an
arrestee to the collection of an arrestee's DNA.' DNA and
fingerprints can both be left behind on a drinking glass for any
member of the public or the police to collect. However, DNA
obtained from an arrestee holds the possibility of being significantly
more revealing than a fingerprint. A fingerprint shows ridges and
curves that are meaningless unless there is a sample with which to
match it. DNA can show various traits without necessarily requiring a
match. Though some commentators have asserted that the typical
DNA testing does not reveal those sorts of intimate details,47 the
44. Id. at 14.
45. See Williamson v. State, 993 A.2d 626, 649, 652, 654 (Md. 2010) (Bell, C.J.,
dissenting). "Fingerprint analysis and DNA analysis, in fact, are not akin to each other.
DNA analysis involves more than just collection of DNA, the testing of the sample
collected is a significant invasion, a search, it has been held." Id. at 649. Chief Judge Bell
has argued similarly in dissent in a prior case: "Unlike fingerprints, which contain all of the
useable identifying information at the time the prints are taken, the DNA search does not
end with the swab. To the contrary, the swab is then subjected to scientific tests, which
may extract very sensitive, personal, and potentially humiliating information." State v.
Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 62-63 (Md. 2004) (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
46. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[F]ingerprinting
and DNA indexing serve similar purposes."); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184
(3d Cir. 2005) (likening the collection of DNA from individual on supervised release to
photographing and fingerprinting at the time of his arrest); Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556,
1559 (9th Cir. 1995) ("The information derived from the blood sample is substantially the
same as that derived from fingerprinting."). Even when the collection of DNA requires a
blood sample, the Ninth Circuit stated that "rolling a person's fingertips does not elevate
the intrusion upon the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment interests to a level beyond minimal."
Rise, 59 F.3d at 1560. Notably, these cases dealt with the collection of DNA from
convicted felons, a distinction which may be significant. See infra notes 165-82 and
accompanying text.
47. See D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 455, 461-62 (2001); John Maddux, Comment, Arresting Development: A
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nature of DNA and the possibilities of abuse could allow more traits
to be revealed, setting DNA apart from fingerprints.48
Furthermore, at least one judge has pointed out in a challenge to
a DNA database law that some modicum of suspicion is required in
order to even collect an arrestee's fingerprints.49 And fingerprinting
an arrestee only requires taking identifying information from the
body's surface, in contrast to a cheek swab that requires intrusion into
one's mouth. As this Recent Development will argue, there is a
subjective and objective reasonable expectation of privacy in a
person's body; thus bodily intrusions to collect DNA must be justified
by probable cause embodied in a search warrant or a valid
exception.50 DNA collection is not analogous to fingerprinting; DNA
reveals details that cannot be obtained from the whorls of a
thumbprint.
One might argue that DNA collection simply reflects the
progression of technology for identification, along the lines of the
progression from sketches to photographic mugshots.5 ' The Supreme
Court considered the use of advanced technology in criminal
investigations in Kyllo v. United States.52 Federal officers used thermal
imaging technology to determine whether there was an unusual
amount of heat being emitted at Danny Kyllo's residence, which
could indicate that he was growing marijuana using heat lamps.53
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, acknowledged that the use of this
technology was more than "naked eye surveillance."5 4 The majority
Call for North Carolina to Expand Its Forensic Database by Collecting DNA from Felony
Arrestees, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 103, 107-08 (2009).
48. Kaye, supra note 47, at 506-07 (discussing "front-loaded" and "back-loaded"
systems to prevent abuse of DNA databases, but acknowledging that no system will ever
be perfect); see also Neff & Locke, supra note 24 (noting the investigation into the SBI's
suspected wrongdoing).
49. Rise, 59 F.3d at 1570 n.4 (Nelson, J., dissenting). Judge Nelson also argued that
there is a lower expectation of privacy in fingerprints because they are exposed to the
public. Id. at 1570. Judge Nelson may have been subtly referring to the fact that
fingerprints are left on drinking glasses in public. As this Recent Development has pointed
out, DNA can also be left on drinking glasses. This would tend to support a similar, lesser
expectation of privacy in one's DNA; however, DNA contains a wealth of information not
contained in a fingerprint. See id. (noting that fingerprinting " 'involves none of the
probing into an individual's private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or
search'" (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1973))).
50. See infra Part II.A-B and Part III.
51. Cf Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 184-85 (comparing the collection of DNA from
individual on supervised release to photographing and fingerprinting at the time of his
arrest).
52. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
53. Id. at 29-30.
54. Id. at 33.
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ultimately concluded that there was a search and that the warrantless
search was unreasonable." In so concluding, the Kyllo majority
distinguished the case from Dow Chemical v. United States6 in that
the advanced photographic technology at issue in Dow was not used
to survey the interior of the home-unlike the thermal imaging in
Kyllo.7 The Kyllo Court held that police may not use "sense-
enhancing technology" that "is not in general public use" to collect
information from the interior of a home, information which would
otherwise require a trespass upon the home to obtain.ss
As the Supreme Court pointed out in the context of thermal
imaging, the technological progression argument equating DNA
matching with photographic identification fails to capture the
complex technological assistance needed to make a positive
identification with DNA." The naked eye can identify a perpetrator
from a mugshot; the same cannot be said for DNA.' Photographic
identification is simpler than the enhanced photographic aerial
surveillance in Dow Chemical, which was held not to be a search by
the Supreme Court.6 1 DNA technology is more akin to the thermal
imaging that was found to be a search in Kyllo because forensic DNA
technology is advanced and not in general public use. The average
person is unlikely to be able to acquire the necessary equipment and
ably employ the proper techniques to find a DNA match at home.
While drugstores now carry paternity tests and genetic testing kits,
the samples customers collect must still be sent to a lab where
professionals analyze them.62 DNA collection, like the thermal
imaging surveillance conducted on Kyllo's home, intrudes upon one's
person, a place that is sacred in the law.63 DNA thus cannot likely be
55. Id. at 40.
56. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
57. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
58. Id. at 34.
59. See generally Donald E. Riley, DNA Testing: An Introduction for Non-Scientists,
SCi. TESTIMONY (Apr. 6, 2005), http://www.scientific.org/tutorials/articles/riley/riley.html
(describing the two primary types of forensic DNA testing and the technological methods
involved).
60. Id.
61. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 239.
62. See JoNel Aleccia, Who's Your Daddy? Answer's at the Drugstore, MSNBC.COM
(Mar. 23, 2008), http://www.msnbc.msn.comlid/23814032/ns/health-womens health/;
Daniel DeNoon, Concerns Raised About Drugstore Genetic Test, CBS NEWS.COM (May
12, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/13/health/webmd/main6480841.shtml.
63. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated .... ") (emphasis added). It is also true that the home is even more sacred in the
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31, 40. The Court in
1317
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
deemed sufficiently analogous to photographic identification to
support routine DNA collection upon arrest because DNA
technology is more advanced and the typical citizen cannot fully
employ DNA technology himself.
Recall that Katz is the touchstone case for determining whether
there was a search and that Justice Harlan's concurrence, which asked
whether the person who argued he was searched had a subjective
expectation of privacy and whether that expectation of privacy is
objectively reasonable, has become the measure for whether a search
occurred.' Two cases suggest a subjective and objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in one's body: Cupp v. Murphy65 and
Schmerber v. California."6 A discussion of these cases will show that
because a swab of an arrestee's cheek goes beyond the surface of the
body, it should thus be regarded as a search.67
A. There Is a Subjective Expectation of Privacy in an Arrestee's
Cheek Cells
The subjective expectation of privacy is likely met by the fact
that one's cheek cells, unlike saliva and fingerprints, have not been
displayed to the public or abandoned.68 The Court has characterized
this prong as "whether he has shown that 'he [sought] to preserve
[something] as private.' "6' Using an opaque bag while traveling was
found to exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy as to the bag's
contents." Likewise, one's cheeks could be considered the
metaphorical opaque bag in which there would be a subjective
expectation of privacy as to the cheek cells and the DNA contained
therein.
Kyllo partially rested its holding on the fact that the thermal imaging intruded into a
home, as opposed to other areas that the Fourth Amendment provides less protection. Id.
at 40. Although DNA extraction through a cheek swab involves an intrusion into a
person's mouth as opposed to her home, the application of the Court's discussion of
advanced technology in Kyllo is useful as far as it applies to all searches and not just home
intrusions.
64. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
65. 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
66. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
67. See id. at 769 (acknowledging implicitly that going beneath the skin's surface is a
search, using the phrase "searches involving intrusions beyond the body's surface").
68. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
69. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 740 (1979)).
70. Id.
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The Court also recognized in Cupp that citizens have a high
regard for the security of their bodies." Cupp involved a man, Daniel
Murphy, who was accused of his wife's murder by strangulation.72 By
force and without a search warrant, officers scraped beneath
Murphy's fingernails.7 3 The scrapings matched his wife's skin, blood,
and nightgown, and the report was introduced at trial.74
The Court declared that "the search of [Murphy]'s fingernails
went beyond mere 'physical characteristics ... constantly exposed to
the public,' . . . and constituted the type of 'severe, though brief,
intrusion upon cherished personal security' that is subject to
constitutional scrutiny."75 Much like fingernail scraping, a cheek swab
requires a technician, with whom the arrestee is likely unfamiliar, to
physically collect a substance from the arrestee's body. Though this
encounter lasts but a few moments, the subject of the swabbing
nonetheless feels invaded. A cheek swab is a "severe, though brief,
intrusion"7 upon an arrestee's subjective privacy interest in his body
that must conform to the Fourth Amendment."
B. There Is an Objective Expectation of Privacy in an Arrestee's
Cheek Cells
The objective prong of Justice Harlan's test is well demonstrated
in Schmerber v. California." Schmerber involved a blood-alcohol test
performed on Armando Schmerber, a driver whom police believed
was drunk." The officer who requested the blood sample responded
to the scene of Schmerber's car accident, smelled Schmerber's breath,
71. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
24-25 (1968)).
72. Id. at 292.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 295 (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968)).
76. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968).
77. See also Kaye, supra note 47, at 472 (stating that "the threshold question of
whether there is a search should be answered in the affirmative," but ultimately arguing
that a "carefully designed" DNA database system would make such a search reasonable).
To contrast the argument by Professor Kaye, officers perpetrating a different sort of abuse
might make unauthorized arrests in order to obtain additional DNA samples for the
database. Robert Berlet, Comment, A Step Too Far: Due Process and DNA Collection in
California After Proposition 69, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1481, 1510 (2007). Incidentally, in
the Ballona Creek episode of Law & Order: Los Angeles, supra note 1, the district
attorney pressured a woman raped eighteen years earlier to file a report with the Santa
Ana police in order to obtain a DNA sample from a suspected serial killer.
78. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
79. Id. at 758.
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and observed Schmerber's behavior while in the hospital." The State
introduced the incriminating evidence at trial over Schmerber's
objection that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated."
In deciding the defendant's appeal, the Court stated, "The
interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment
protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired
evidence might be obtained."' Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan
described the necessity of a search warrant, asserting that "[t]he
importance of informed, detached and deliberate determinations of
the issue whether or not to invade another's body in search of
evidence of guilt is indisputable and great."83 Such rhetoric alludes to
the objective prong of Justice Harlan's test. Even before Katz, the
Court concluded that "[compulsory administration of a blood test]
plainly involves the broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment" because the Amendment specifically
lists the "person" as protected.' The Court's previously mentioned
discussion in Dionisio is also illustrative of the reasonableness of the
privacy expectation in one's cheek cells. Therefore, one has both a
subjective and objective reasonable expectation of privacy because
DNA is hidden from view within one's opaque cheeks and the
Supreme Court has recognized a heightened privacy interest in one's
own body that is respected by society.86
Given the Court's finding that blood tests are searches under the
Fourth Amendment, the Katz two-part test can be satisfied in the
DNA collection context by analogizing cheek swabs to blood tests.
80. Id. at 768-69.
81. Id. at 759.
82. Id. at 769-70.
83. Id. at 770.
84. Id. at 767.
85. The Court stated:
The physical characteristics of a person's voice, its tone and manner, as opposed to
the content of a specific conversation, are constantly exposed to the public. Like a
man's facial characteristics, or handwriting, his voice is repeatedly produced for
others to hear. No person can have a reasonable expectation that others will not
know the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect that his face
will be a mystery to the world.
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973).
86. In State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988), the North Carolina
Supreme Court announced a holding similar to Schmerber: a blood sample requires a
search warrant absent exigent circumstances. Id. at 714, 370 S.E.2d at 556. The Carter
court cited Schmerber for support. Id. at 714, 370 S.E.2d at 556. Thus, in North Carolina, a
blood test is termed a search without the court's explicit consideration of the two-pronged
analysis from Katz.
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While a blood test is more intrusive because of the use of a needle, a
cheek swab could also be considered intrusive since one must open
her mouth and allow a stranger to scrape the inside of her cheek.
North Carolina courts should thus find that a swab is a search
requiring a search warrant or proof of a "well-delineated
exception."'
III. A SEARCH REQUIRES A SEARCH WARRANT UNLESS SUBJECT
TO AN EXCEPTION
Based on the above argument that a cheek swab constitutes a
search under the Fourth Amendment, a search warrant for a swab is
required absent an exception. This Part will discuss three exceptions
to the search warrant requirement-search incident to lawful arrest,
inventory search upon arrest, and exigent circumstances-and will
argue that none apply to a warrantless cheek swab.
A. Search Incident to Lawful Arrest
As declared in Chimel v. California," an officer may search the
arrested person and "the area 'within his immediate control' " for the
officer's own safety and to discover evidence that the suspect might
otherwise destroy.8 9
In applying this exception in Schmerber, the Court employed a
similar standard as in Chimel, observing the two rationales for a
search incident to lawful arrest: the need to discover weapons hidden
on the suspect's person and the preservation of evidence that the
suspect may destroy.o These two justifications "have little
87. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
88. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
89. Id. at 762-63; see also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295-96 (1973) (holding that,
even though the scraping of defendant's fingernails was a search, destruction of evidence
was imminent); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71 (finding that the blood extraction was a
reasonable search incident to the defendant's arrest since the evidence of the offense was
being destroyed every second as the defendant's body metabolized the alcohol); 3 WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.3(c), at 171-72 (4th ed. 2004) ("It seems clear
from the Schmerber case that a more demanding test must be met when the search
incident to the arrest involves the taking of a blood sample or the making of some similar
intrusion into the body."). The search for weapons by swabbing an arrestee's cheek has
little relevance since one cannot be injured by DNA; thus only the destruction of evidence
rationale will be discussed in this Recent Development. The North Carolina courts have
applied the doctrine in Chimel. See State v. Thomas, 81 N.C. App. 200, 210, 343 S.E.2d
588, 594 (1986) (stating that a search incident to arrest applies to the area in the arrestee's
immediate control to preserve evidence and the officer's safety); see also State v. Logner,
148 N.C. App. 135, 139, 557 S.E.2d 191, 194 (2001) (quoting the same proposition from
Thomas).
90. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769.
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applicability with respect to searches involving intrusions beyond the
body's surface." 91 Despite that statement, the Court held that the
officer's collection of the defendant's blood was a reasonable search
incident to lawful arrest under the circumstances.' The evidence of
guilt was metabolizing in the defendant's body with every minute of
delay.93 A significant amount of time had also elapsed between the
defendant's car accident, the officer's arrival on the scene, and the
transportation of the defendant to the hospital, further supporting the
search to preserve evidence.94
In Cupp, despite finding that fingernail scrapings were an
intrusion into the defendant's bodily integrity, the Court also held
that the search was reasonable under the imminent destruction of
evidence justification.95 Officers saw Murphy hiding his hands in his
pockets, whereupon they heard the contents of his pockets, including
keys, being jostled.96 On these facts, where it appeared that Murphy
could be destroying evidence, the Court believed that the police had
justification to scrape under Murphy's fingernails in order to preserve
the evidence.97
In view of the unique, exigent circumstances in Schmerber and
Cupp, collecting a suspect's DNA by a cheek swab without a search
warrant does not further law enforcement's need to prevent the
imminent destruction of evidence. An arrestee cannot destroy his
DNA, so there is no need to swab an arrestee immediately. DNA,
furthermore, is not a weapon nor can it conceal one. In sum, both
reasons for searches incident to a lawful arrest are irrelevant to DNA
collection.98
B. Inventory Search
In performing an arrest inventory, an officer collects an
arrestee's belongings, including clothing and personal effects.99 The
91. Id.
92. Id. at 771. Prior to this holding, the Court found that the policeman had probable
cause to arrest the defendant for driving under the influence. Id. at 768.
93. Id. at 770.
94. Id. at 770-71.
95. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295-96 (1973).
96. Id. at 296.
97. Id.
98. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769.
99. See LAFAVE, supra note 89, § 5.3, at 144 ("A search is considered to be 'of the
person' for the purposes of this section if it involves an examination of or intrusion into
the body, or if it necessitates scrutiny of or looking into clothing worn at the time of arrest
or effects found in that clothing, whether or not the clothing or effects were actually on the
person at the time of the search.").
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officer then catalogs and safely stores the items until the person is
released. An inventory search does not have to be supported by
probable cause'" and does not violate the Fourth Amendment if
performed under standard operating procedures.101 Protecting the
arrestee's belongings, protecting the police department from false
claims of larceny, and protecting the jailhouse from contraband and
weapons justify an inventory search.10 As recognized by the Court in
Florida v. Wells,103 an inventory search may not be a general search
for inculpatory evidence disguised by standard operating
procedure." The Wells Court further recognized that an inventory
search must be connected to the aforesaid purposes.10
DNA is not collected for the purpose of protecting an arrestee's
belongings, shielding the police from false claims of theft, or
defending the jail from weapons and drugs. DNA is not a belonging
that can be stolen in the sense that a wallet or clothing can be stolen.
A prisoner is not likely to lodge a complaint against the department
for stealing her DNA. DNA is also not a weapon that would
endanger the general safety of the jail. As Wells showed, regardless of
whether the collection is under standard procedures, such searches
under the guise of inventories must relate to the aforesaid goals.
Swabs of arrestees fail to relate to those goals.
C. Exigent Circumstances
In addition to likely falling outside of the search incident to
lawful arrest and inventory exceptions, DNA evidence taken from an
arrestee is not justified by exigent circumstances. Exigent
circumstances is an independent exception to the search warrant
requirement,106 and it is often an underlying consideration in other
100. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 (1983).
101. See id. at 648. North Carolina courts have held that "[a]n inventory, pursuant to
standard police procedures, is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." State v.
Jones, 63 N.C. App. 411, 418, 305 S.E.2d 221, 225 (1983). The North Carolina Supreme
Court has also noted that "[i]t is not an unlawful search or seizure for officers to take from
the person under arrest and to examine an article of clothing worn by him." State v.
Shedd, 274 N.C. 95, 102, 161 S.E.2d 477,482 (1968).
102. Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 646.
103. 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
104. Id. at 4.
105. See id. (citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 376 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 648; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369
(1976)).
106. See LAFAVE, supra note 89, § 4.1, at 402 (calling exigent circumstances the
"emergency doctrine").
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search warrant exceptions." This exception is premised on an
emergency that prevents officers from applying for a search
warrant.'0 Dispensing with the warrant requirement in an urgent
situation is not unreasonable; it would be unreasonable to require a
warrant.' 09 Examples of exigent circumstances include pursuit of a
fleeing felon,"o prevention of the imminent destruction of evidence,'
and preservation of officer safety."12
Arrestees in the jailhouse are not fleeing felons, and the police
are not in hot pursuit. The arrestee has already been detained at the
police station, awaiting the arrival of a technician to swab his cheek.
Flight from authority has already ceased. As previously mentioned,
DNA is not evidence that can be destroyed, unlike illicit drugs that
might be destroyed with the push of the toilet lever. Officer safety is
not a concern in this instance that would justify a warrantless cheek
swab.
A warrantless search in the form of a swab of an arrestee's check
thus cannot be defended on the basis of any of the "well-delineated
exceptions"" 3 discussed above: search incident to lawful arrest,
inventory search, or exigent circumstances.114
107. See, e.g., supra Part III.A (discussing that imminent destruction of evidence and
the officer's immediate need for safety justify a search incident to lawful arrest).
108. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (stating that exigent circumstances may
justify a warrantless search); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 288-89 (1967) ("The Fourth
Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to
do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.").
109. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); see Terry, 392 U.S. at 20; Warden,
387 U.S. at 288-89 (stating that "speed was essential").
110. See Warden, 387 U.S. at 288-89.
111. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569-73 (1991) (discussing exigency in the
context of vehicle searches); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (noting this
exigency as a justification for searches incident to lawful arrest); Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23, 40 (1963) (plurality opinion) ("Suspects have no constitutional right to destroy or
dispose of evidence.").
112. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63 (holding this exigency to be a justification for
searches incident to lawful arrest); Warden, 387 U.S. at 288-89.
113. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
114. A reviewing court may also attempt to apply the "plain view" doctrine to
warrantless cheek swabs. Justice Stevens described the doctrine as "merely authoriz[ing]
an officer with a lawful right of access to an item to seize it without a [search] warrant."
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 142 (1990). For example, evidence in plain view may be
seized if police have entered a home pursuant to a search warrant or an exigent
circumstance, or if police are searching a suspect incident to a lawful arrest. See id. at 135.
However, the plain view exception only allows for the seizure of evidence that
immediately appears to be incriminating to the investigating officer. Id. at 137. DNA
contained in cheek cells is not immediately incriminating evidence since it must be
scientifically analyzed to find a match. Further, even if one were to construe DNA to be
incriminating evidence in a particular circumstance, the officer would still not have a
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IV. OTHER JURISDICTIONS' TREATMENT OF THE ISSUE
At least two other states' courts have considered Fourth
Amendment appeals under laws similar to the DNA Database Act.
As explained below, the Minnesota Court of Appeals employed the
correct analysis and drew the logical conclusions while the Virginia
Supreme Court reached a less constitutionally sound holding.
A. The Minnesota Court of Appeals' Analysis and Conclusion Was
Correct
The Minnesota Court of Appeals engaged in a logical analysis in
In re C. T.L."s by examining the search issue, comparing the privacy
interests of criminal defendants and incarcerated prisoners, and
noting the insignificance of taking DNA for solving the crime
charged."' Though not following the exact methodology this Recent
Development has laid out, In re C.T.L.'s invalidation of Minnesota's
DNA database law is instructive on the unreasonableness of cheek
swabs.
C.T.L. was charged as a juvenile for aiding and abetting
aggravated robbery in the first degree and committing an assault in
the fifth degree."' The State ordered C.T.L. to give a DNA sample,
and he refused."' The district court upheld the challenge, finding that
"compulsory DNA profiling of criminal defendants prior to
conviction" violated the Constitution.119 The district court certified
the question to the Minnesota Court of Appeals to determine
whether-by authorizing the extraction of DNA before a
conviction-section 299C.105 violated the Minnesota Constitution
and the U.S. Constitution.120
For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the State conceded that
taking a juvenile's DNA and subjecting it to testing constituted a
search and seizure, but the court still considered the issue to some
"lawful right of access" to the arrestee's cheek cells, and thus the seizure would still be
unconstitutional. One might also try to analogize DNA to hair, which is exposed to the
public and thus not protected by the Fourth Amendment under Katz. As previously
argued in Part II, DNA may be exposed to the public in other ways, such as in saliva, but
not in cheek cells. DNA is a physical characteristic, but it is not generally shown to the
public in the same way that hair can be seen by all passersby. Therefore, unlike hair, one
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the DNA contained in one's cheek cells.
115. 722 N.W.2d 484 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
116. Id. at 488, 491.
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extent.1 21 The court looked to Skinner v. Railroad Labor Executives
Ass'nl22 for support.1" As the Skinner Court observed, "the collection
and subsequent analysis of the requisite biological samples must be
deemed Fourth Amendment searches."124 The Minnesota Court of
Appeals also drew on language from Katz that searches and seizures
without a search warrant are " 'per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.' "'a The Minnesota court correctly concluded
that the cheek swab was a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, as this Recent Development has argued.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals then considered the
reasonableness of such a search, relying heavily on Schmerber.'26 The
court discussed the exigencies at work in Schmerber2 7 and noted that
probable cause to arrest, without an emergency, does not permit a
warrantless search in collecting bodily substances.'28 The Minnesota
court stated the principle succinctly: "Search warrants are ordinarily
required for searches of dwellings, and absent an emergency, no less
could be required where intrusions into the human body are
concerned."' 29  Without explicitly concluding that exigent
circumstances were lacking in In re C. T L, the court made no mention
of flight or danger that evidence would be destroyeds13 and ultimately
concluded that collecting an arrestee's DNA without a search warrant
violated the Fourth Amendment.13 1
The court further pointed out that the standards for an arrest
warrant are different from those for a search warrant. 32 In
Minnesota, the standard for a search warrant is whether there is " 'a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place.' "13 However, the quoted language tracks
Illinois v. Gates,134 in which the Supreme Court established the federal
121. Id. at 488.
122. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
123. In re C T.L., 722 N.W.2d at 488.
124. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618.
125. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
126. See id. at 488-91.
127. Id. at 490.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 489.
130. See id. at 489-90.
131. Id. at 492.
132. Id. at 490.
133. Id. (quoting State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 633 (Minn. 1995)).
134. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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standard for a search warrant. 135 A Minnesota arrest warrant must be
based upon " 'evidence worthy of consideration ... [that] brings the
charge against the prisoner within reasonable probability.' "16
The court highlighted an excellent distinction between the two
types of warrants.' 7 An arrest warrant is based on different standards
than a search warrant and does not include the same considerations
as a search warrant.13 8 A warrantless search must be justified by an
applicable exception.139
The State cited several federal opinions that employ a balancing
test between the state's interests and the defendant's privacy
interests.14 The court fittingly highlighted that these federal cases did
not involve defendants; the federal cases cited involved convicts, who
have a lower expectation of privacy than individuals who have not yet
been convicted.141 Also, considering that a person is "presumed
innocent until proved guilty," the court concluded that a person who
135. Id. at 238.
136. In re C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d at 490 (quoting State v. Koenig, 666 N.W.2d 366, 372
(Minn. 2003)). North Carolina has adopted the "totality of the circumstances test" from
Gates for the issuance of search warrants. State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 642, 319 S.E.2d
254, 260 (1984) (adopting the standard from Gates).
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,
including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place.
Id. at 638, 319 S.E.2d at 257-58 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 214). A reviewing court's task
is "simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' that
probable cause existed." Id. at 638, 319 S.E.2d at 258 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39).
The North Carolina standard for an arrest warrant is "sufficient information, supported by
oath or affirmation, to make an independent judgment that there is probable cause to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-304(d) (2009). Though North Carolina and Minnesota do not have
identical standards for arrest warrants, their respective laws show that there is a
meaningful difference in the standards for a search warrant versus an arrest warrant.
137. In re C T.L., 722 N.W.2d at 490.
138. Id.
139. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
140. In re C.TL., 722 N.W.2d at 491 (citing Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F. Supp. 583, 588
(D. Minn. 1995); Johnson v. Quander, 370 F. Supp. 2d 79, 87 (D.D.C. 2005), affd, 440 F.3d
489 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Padgett v. Ferrero, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1343 (N.D. Ga. 2003), aff'd
sub nom. Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Sczubelek,
255 F. Supp. 2d 315, 323 (D. Del. 2003), aff'd, 402 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2005)).
141. Id. The Minnesota statute requires the database administrators to destroy the
DNA and expunge the record from the database if the charges are dismissed or if the
defendant is found not guilty. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.105(3) (West 2007). The court
interpreted this as legislative intent to give more weight to the privacy interests of those
who have not yet been convicted. In re C T.L., 722 N.W.2d at 491.
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has not yet been convicted has a greater privacy interest in her DNA
than the state's interest in obtaining the DNA evidence. 4 2 The court
aptly noted that "[u]nder the statute, it is not necessary for anyone to
even consider whether the biological specimen to be taken is related
in any way to the charged crime or to any other criminal activity." 143
Recall that the Court in Schmerber stated that bodily intrusions
should not be undertaken lightly "on the mere chance that desired
evidence might be obtained."'" In Schmerber, the blood test would
prove the defendant's intoxication, which is one element of driving
while intoxicated, the offense for which the defendant was arrested.145
The fact that the collection of an arrestee's DNA may have nothing to
do with matching it to evidence from the crime scene indicated to the
C. TL. court that warrantless cheek swabs are unconstitutional.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reached the appropriate
conclusion regarding the collection and analysis of DNA from
arrestees by deciding that a search had occurred, finding that a search
warrant is still required since no exigencies were present although an
arrest warrant had been obtained, and distinguishing other DNA
database case law that dealt only with convicted felons who have a
lesser expectation of privacy. Though this Recent Development has
laid out a different form of analysis, North Carolina courts should
ultimately reach the same conclusion to find that the DNA Database
Act of 2010 authorizes unconstitutional searches.
B. The Virginia Supreme Court Applied Unsuitable Precedent and
Reached an Unsound Conclusion
The Virginia Supreme Court considered its DNA database law in
Anderson v. Commonwealth.'46 While on her way to work in the
summer of 1991, Laura Berry was raped, sodomized, and robbed.147
Angel Anderson was arrested in 2003 on unrelated charges of rape
and sodomy. 148 Police collected a DNA sample from Anderson and
entered it into the system under Virginia Code section 19.2-310.2:1.149
Anderson's DNA appeared to match the DNA collected from Ms.
Berry in 1991.so Officers applied for and were granted a search
142. In re C. T.L., 722 N.W.2d at 492.
143. Id. at 491.
144. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).
145. Id. at 758-59.
146. 650 S.E.2d 702 (Va. 2007).
147. Id. at 703.
148. Id. at 704.
149. VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-310.2:1 (2008); Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 704.
150. Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 704.
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warrant to obtain Anderson's DNA for further, more detailed
analysis."'1 DNA analysts found that Anderson's DNA was a match.15 2
Anderson was indicted, convicted, and sentenced to two life
sentences and ten years for the rape, sodomy, and robbery of Ms.
Berry.'53 Anderson argued that the seizure of his DNA for a crime
unrelated to the one for which he was convicted violated the Fourth
Amendment.'54 The Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed his
convictions."' The Virginia Supreme Court, in upholding the court of
appeals, relied on precedent dealing with individuals who had been
convicted through the criminal justice process."' The justices also
relied on an arguably flawed analogy to fingerprinting without
explicating whether the cheek swab was a search.'
The Virginia Supreme Court looked to Jones v. Murray,58 a
Fourth Circuit case that upheld a related Virginia statute requiring
convicted felons to produce a DNA sample.' The Anderson court
admitted that the statute at bar allowed DNA samples to be collected
from arrestees, not convicts, but it nonetheless announced that
section 19.2-310.2:1 did not transgress the Fourth Amendment.'60
The basis for the court's holding is a debatable analogy to
fingerprinting: "A DNA sample of the accused taken upon arrest,
while more revealing, is no different in character than acquiring
fingerprints upon arrest." 6' As previously argued, DNA collection is
not sufficiently similar to fingerprinting to support such an analogy.162
DNA holds the key to information that cannot be obtained from
fingerprints.163
The Virginia court attempted to bolster its position by stating
that the analogy between fingerprints and DNA is "widely
accepted."" The federal and state cases cited by the court supported






156. Id. at 705.
157. See id. at 705-06.
158. 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992).
159. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2 (2008); Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 705 (citing Jones,
962 F.2d at 308).
160. Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 705.
161. Id.
162. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
164. Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 705.
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context of convicted felons in prison or on supervised release."s
Proceeding through the cases cited, the Second Circuit in Nicholas v.
Goord'" and the Ninth Circuit in Rise v. Oregon16 1 supported the
analogy in suits by convicted felons.'" In United States v. Sczubelek,69
the Third Circuit announced a similar holding when a former inmate
on supervised release refused to give a DNA sample.' All of the
state court opinions cited by the Anderson majority were appeals
pursued by incarcerated felons."'
The distinction between persons who have been convicted of a
crime and those who have not yet been tried is substantial. In Hudson
v. Palmer,'72 the Supreme Court held that prisoners have no
legitimate expectation of privacy in their prison cells.'73 The Court has
acknowledged shades of privacy rights dependent upon the
individual's status in the criminal justice system. Later, the Court
clarified that "[Hudson] is of limited usefulness outside the prison
context with respect to the coverage of the Fourth Amendment."'74
The Court assumed for argument's sake in Bell v. Wolfish.. that a
defendant detained pending trial has "retained at least a 'diminished
expectation of privacy.' "17 The Anderson court failed to
acknowledge the privacy differences dependent upon an individual's
level of incarceration.
The distinction between those who have been convicted and
those not yet tried also affects the purported state interest in DNA
identification, making the analogy to fingerprints less tenable. Even
granting that fingerprints and DNA can identify a suspect,
fingerprints do so less intrusively, obviating the need for DNA to
accomplish the same goal."' In the Jones decision, upon which the
Anderson court relied, the Fourth Circuit used expansive language
regarding identification:
165. See id.
166. 430 F.3d 652 (2d Cir. 2005).
167. 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995).
168. Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 655, 671; Rise, 59 F.3d at 1559-60.
169. 402 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2005).
170. Id. at 184-85.
171. See State v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 33 (Md. 2004); State v. O'Hagen, 914 A.2d 267,
281 (N.J. 2007); State v. Brown, 157 P.3d 301, 302-03 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
172. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
173. Id. at 525-26.
174. Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 65 (1992).
175. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
176. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 524 n.6 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 557).
177. See Kaye, supra note 47, at 488 ("[F]ingerprints already provide an unequivocal,
and in some respects, better record of personal identity than forensic DNA typing.").
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[W]hen a suspect is arrested upon probable cause, his
identification becomes a matter of legitimate state interest and
he can hardly claim privacy in it. We accept this proposition
because the identification of suspects is relevant not only to
solving the crime for which the suspect is arrested, but also for
maintaining a permanent record to solve other past and future
crimes."'
Taken out of context, Jones practically decides Anderson;
however, the Fourth Circuit concluded this passage with reference
only to identification of incarcerated felons."' The Anderson court
invoked Professor Wayne LaFave's treatise to state that the "taking
of a DNA sample by minimally intrusive means 'is justified by the
legitimate interest of the government in knowing for an absolute
certainty the identity of the person arrested, in knowing whether he is
wanted elsewhere, and in ensuring his identification in the event he
flees prosecution.' "Iso The contextual difference between felons and
arrestees fails to support the analogy from fingerprints to DNA.
Moreover, recidivism was tied in with the state's interest in
identification of convicted felons.1s' Recidivism cannot similarly be
tied to arrested individuals to justify a greater state interest in
identification.
The Anderson decision employed precedent that dealt with
convicted felons, failed to address the distinctions between such
individuals and arrestees, and inadequately supported the analogy
from fingerprints to DNA. As such, Anderson's approval of Virginia's
DNA database law should not be followed by North Carolina courts
in considering challenges to the DNA Database Act of 2010.
V. POLICY
The supporters of DNA database laws posit several rationales
for their existence. The main reasons include "catch[ing] repeat
178. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1993).
179. Id. at 306-07 ("As with fingerprinting, therefore, we find that the Fourth
Amendment does not require an additional finding of individualized suspicion before
blood can be taken from incarcerated felons for the purpose of identifying them.")
(emphasis added).
180. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 706 (Va. 2007) (quoting LAFAVE,
supra note 89, § 5.3(c), at 168). Professor LaFave made the quoted statement with
reference to fingerprinting an arrestee. LAFAVE, supra note 89, § 5.3(c), at 168
("Fingerprinting, as a routine part of the booking process is justified by the legitimate
interest of the government in knowing for an absolute certainty the identity of the person
arrested, in knowing whether he is wanted elsewhere, and in ensuring his identification in
the event he flees prosecution . . . .").
181. See Jones, 962 F.2d at 304-07.
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offenders sooner, prevent[ing] violent crimes, . . . and reduc[ing]
criminal justice costs."'" These rationales are flawed.
A. The Asserted Goals of Jailing Career Criminals and Preventing
Violent Crimes Are Based on Logical Fallacies
The argument that DNA database laws will catch career
criminals sooner and prevent violent crimes is logically unsound.
Essentially, this argument presumes that collecting arrestee X's DNA
will lead to a conviction for crime A, and it concludes that if arrestee
X was not convicted of crime A, then he would commit crimes B, C,
and so on.
The premise that collection of DNA will be guaranteed to lead to
a conviction is untenable. A conviction cannot be guaranteed given
several variables, including the exclusionary rule barring other
evidence that was obtained wrongfully, other pretrial motions by
defense counsel, uncooperative witnesses, and a not guilty verdict by
a jury.'83 DNA could be helpful in solving future crimes committed by
the convicted felon; however, an arrestee's DNA can be expunged
from the system if the arrestee is not convicted.184
The conclusion that a DNA database would assist in convicting a
criminal in the future is less flawed than the premises, as evidenced by
data showing the recidivism rates for convicted felons.8
Nevertheless, DNA evidence would only assist in imprisoning an
individual in the future if DNA is left behind at the crime scene. If an
individual does not leave biological material at the scene, then police
will not be able to solve the case any quicker with the DNA database
than without it. Thus, the inability to guarantee a conviction lessens
the future applications of an arrestee's DNA and may largely thwart
the asserted goals of jailing career criminals and preventing violent
crimes.
182. Why Pass the DNA Law?, DNA SAVES, http://www.dnasaves.org/dna_1aw.php
(last visited Apr. 12, 2011).
183. At least one study shows that only about fifty percent of CODIS (Combined DNA
Index System) hits result in convictions. JAY SIEGEL & SUSAN D. NARVESON, WHY
ARRESTEE DNA LEGISLATION CAN SAVE INDIANA TAXPAYERS OVER $60 MILLION
PER YEAR 6-7 (2009), available at http://www.dnasaves.org/files/IN DNACostSavings
.Study.pdf.
184. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
185. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism, DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=17 (last visited Apr. 12, 2011). Of
approximately 300,000 inmates released from prisons in fifteen states in 1994, nearly
seventy percent were arrested within three years for another offense. Id.
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B. Alleged Cost Savings Do Not Outweigh the Value of Civil Rights
While society often gives up some modicum of civil liberties in
exchange for security, the DNA Database Act sacrifices civil liberties
in exchange for budget cuts. In Indiana, a DNA database law was
estimated to save the state anywhere from $7 million to $66 million.186
In a time when many Americans are angry with government
spending, this argument has some appeal. The difficult question is
where to draw the line. Though North Carolina could save $127
million by cutting the indigent defense fund from the budget,"' it is
an unacceptable diminution of civil liberties.' 8
This Recent Development has further asserted that the violation
of individuals' Fourth Amendment rights by collecting DNA upon
arrest is constitutionally unacceptable. The Supreme Court has long
lauded the role of the "neutral and detached magistrate" that
intercedes between the suspect and "the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."' "When the right of
privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be
decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or Government
enforcement agent."190 The Schmerber Court, in reliance on this often
quoted language from Johnson v. United States, declared that the
rational and independent consideration of the magistrate or judge
takes on colossal significance when government agents wish to
intrude on an individual's bodily security.'9 In short, civil rights are
worth more than can be quantified by cost savings in the state's
budget.
186. SIEGEL & NARVESON, supra note 183, at 6, 9 fig.10. Indiana's budget for the fiscal
years of 2008 and 2009 was around $13 billion. STATE BUDGET AGENCY, STATE OF
INDIANA: LIST OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE BIENNIUM JULY 1, 2007 TO JUNE 30, 2009,
at 1 (2009), available at http://www.state.in.us/sbalfiles/ap_2007-all.pdf. Even if the law
would have saved $66 million, this constitutes only half of one percent of the state's
budget. Id.
187. OFFICE OF STATE BUDGET & MGMT., RECOMMENDED OPERATING BUDGET,
2009-2011: JUSTICE AND PUBLIC SAFETY 13 (2009), available at http://www.osbm.state
.nc.us/files/pdf files/bgt0911v4r.pdf.
188. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473 (1966) (asserting that the warning to a
defendant that he may have counsel present during questioning is a "hollow" guarantee
without the assurance that counsel can be appointed if the defendant is indigent).
189. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
190. Id.
191. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,770 (1966) (citing Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14).
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C. The Better Solution: Criminal Justice Law Enforcement
Automated Data Services
North Carolina is already making strides in capturing and
punishing criminal offenders while saving taxpayers' money and
protecting civil liberties at the same time. In response to the murder
of Eve Carson, the state partnered with SAS, a private software
corporation headquartered in Cary, North Carolina, to pilot a new
criminal database in Wake County called Criminal Justice Law
Enforcement Automated Data Services (CJLEADS) that brings
information from a variety of sources onto a single computer
screen.19 CJLEADS is designed to make a complete picture of an
offender available to criminal justice professionals."' In addition, the
database has a feature called "offender watch" to alert law
enforcement when an individual's criminal status has changed.'94 The
overarching goal is for law enforcement and criminal justice officials
to make better decisions with the complete history of an offender at
their fingertips.'95 This system would allow police to more easily track
criminal offenders without invading an arrestee's body.
The pilot program began in Wake County 96 in July 2010.197 At
the end of 2010, over 2,000 criminal justice professionals had been
trained to use CJLEADS."' The State Controller's Office has
recommended an "aggressive regional deployment approach" to
192. CILEADS-Criminal Justice Law Enforcement Automated Data Services, OFFICE
OF STATE CONTROLLER, http://www.ncosc.net/cjleads/cjleads.html (last visited Apr. 12,
2011); Mark Johnson, N.C. Builds a Better Rap Sheet, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Jan. 3, 2010, at 1A, available at http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/01/03/265764/nc-
builds-a-better-rap-sheet.html#storylink= misearch; John McCann, CILEADS May Help
Prevent Major Crimes, HERALD SUN (Durham, N.C.), Nov. 15, 2010, at C1, available at
http://www.heraldsun.com/view/full-story/10314132/article-CJLEADS-may-help-prevent-
major-crimes?instance=homethirdleft.
193. OFFICE OF STATE CONTROLLER, supra note 192.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Wake County is the second most populous county in North Carolina. North
Carolina by County, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCfTable
?_bm=y&-geo id=04000US37&-_boxheadnbr=GCT-T1-R&-dsname=PEP2009EST
&-_1ang=en&-format=ST-2S&-_sse=on (last visited Apr. 12, 2011).
197. THE OFFICE OF N.C. STATE CONTROLLER, NORTH CAROLINA CRIMINAL
JUSTICE DATA INTEGRATION PILOT PROGRAM QUARTERLY REPORT: OCTOBER 2010,
at 3 (2010) [hereinafter OCTOBER 2010 QUARTERLY REPORT], available at
http://www.ncosc.net/cjleads/BEACON CriminalJusticePilotOct_2010_final.pdf.
198. N.C. OFFICE OF THE STATE CONTROLLER, NORTH CAROLINA CRIMINAL
JUSTICE LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTOMATED DATA SERVICES (CJLEADS) QUARTERLY
REPORT: JANUARY 2011, at 3 (2011) [hereinafter JANUARY 2011 QUARTERLY REPORT],
available at http://www.ncosc.net/cjleads/CJLEADS-QuarterlyReport-Jan2011final
.pdf.
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implement CJLEADS across the state.'" The plan would take about
eighteen months beginning in January 2011.2@ Statewide
implementation would allow all law enforcement organizations-
local, state, and federal-the opportunity to access the database.201
As of April 2010, over 13.2 million clustered offender records
were stored by CJLEADS, a compilation of 39.8 million records from
the Administrative Office of the Courts, the Department of
Corrections, and local jail information. 21 The most recent release in
December 2010 added records from the Department of Motor
Vehicles and the sex offender database.203 SAS also developed a
"night vision" setting for officers to use when the light from a
computer screen might compromise their safety.21 Work has already
begun to add "real time" record updates, including arrest warrant
information from NCAWARE (a statewide warrant repository),
concealed handgun permit records, and juvenile records to the system
for release in the spring of 201 1.205 Technical support is available
around the clock.206
Importantly, criminal justice professionals are responding
positively to the use of CJLEADS in the execution of their law
enforcement duties. The CJLEADS administrators surveyed users in
the Wake County pilot program regarding their satisfaction with the
database.2 " All survey respondents agreed that CJLEADS was "a
benefit to their organizations." 208 Ninety-eight percent responded that
CJLEADS "improved their ability to use offender information more
effectively," and ninety-seven percent believed CJLEADS enabled
them to use offender information more efficiently.209 One particular
199. Id. at 11.
200. Id.; see also John McCann, Courts Program Going Statewide, HERALD SUN
(Durham, N.C.), Nov. 17, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.heraldsun.com/view/full
story/10315114/article-Courts-program-going-statewide? (stating the statewide execution
to be in January of 2011).
201. OCrOBER 2010 QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 197, at 11.
202. OFFICE OF THE STATE CONTROLLER, NORTH CAROLINA CRIMINAL JUSTICE
DATA INTEGRATION PILOT PROGRAM QUARTERLY REPORT: APRIL 2010, at 7 (2010)
[hereinafter APRIL 2010 QUARTERLY REPORT], available at http://www.ncosc.net/cjleads/
BEACONCriminalJusticePilotApr_2010_.final.pdf. Clustering is defined as "the
process of mapping individual records to an offender." Id.
203. JANUARY 2011 QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 198, at 8.
204. Id. at 9.
205. OCTOBER 2010 QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 197, at 9-10; JANUARY 2011
QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 198, at 12-13.
206. OCTOBER 2010 QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 197, at 3.
207. JANUARY 2011 QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 198, at 5.
208. Id. at 5.
209. Id.
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user searches CJLEADS prior to scheduled home visits to determine
if someone at the home may have a record of drug and weapons
violations.210 In reference to CJLEADS, a Cary police officer said,
"This might be the best tool we currently have in our toolbox." 211
CJLEADS already has success stories. The Wake County Board
of Alcoholic Beverage Control Law Enforcement Division quickly
identified a suspect in a larceny by comparing a photo from video
surveillance to a photo from CJLEADS.2 12 Holly Springs police were
able to run an alias provided by a motorist during a traffic stop.213 Not
only did the officers discover that the driver had several outstanding
warrants, but CJLEADS also informed the officers that his
passengers were wanted on various charges as well.214 The North
Carolina Department of Insurance saved hours of investigation by
using CJLEADS to learn that a fugitive was scheduled to appear in
New Hanover County for a traffic violation.215 The fugitive had been
wanted for over a month. 216 At the North Carolina State Fair, police
used a photograph from CJLEADS, in conjunction with other
technology, to find and remove a sex offender that was legally
prohibited from attending the State Fair.217 CJLEADS allowed a Cary
police officer to learn that an offender was living with his girlfriend,
unbeknownst to the apartment managers, based on the address that
he provided to his parole officer.218 The officer reported that, "If not
for CJLEADS I would have had the warrant returned to the clerk as
unable to locate. To me that was a success for us and the Town of
Cary."219 Significantly, these criminals were apprehended based on
information about their criminal histories, not their genotypes.
In terms of funding, CJLEADS is projected to break even after
the third year of statewide implementation. 220 The database offsets its
costs through improved efficiency of law enforcement, without a
reduction in the workforce, and benefits the economy in preventing
210. Id. This user said, "Love it," regarding this functionality. Id. For more direct
quotes from CJLEADS users, see id. at 32-37.
211. Id. at 7.
212. OCTOBER 2010 QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 197, at 3.
213. Id. at 4.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 3-4.
216. Id. at 3.
217. JANUARY 2011 QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 198, at 6.
218. Id. at 7.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 17.
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citizen deaths.22' Improvements in search efficiency by police and
court officials can save an estimated $14.2 million per year.222 By 2016,
the state controller forecasts a return on investment of about $52
million.22 3 Thus, CJLEADS will result in substantial savings for the
State of North Carolina that-unlike cheek swabs-are untainted by
potential violations of constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
Law-abiding citizens may endorse Governor Perdue's approval
of the DNA Database Act of 2010. Nonetheless, this Act threatens
the civil liberties that the Founding Fathers memorialized in the Bill
of Rights. The Fourth Amendment and its interpretation by the
Supreme Court have drawn the line in the sand to bar unreasonable
searches and seizures. As maintained above, the swabbing of an
arrestee's cheek to collect his or her DNA should be considered a
search under North Carolina case law as well as Supreme Court
jurisprudence illustrating a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's
cheek cells. As such, a search warrant is required for this conduct
unless there is an applicable "well-delineated exception." 224 Such a
swabbing cannot likely be considered a search incident to arrest, an
inventory search, or within the exigent circumstances doctrine.
Additionally, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has followed case
precedent and logic in concluding that a similar DNA database law is
unconstitutional. As argued above, the bases for the Virginia
Supreme Court's decision upholding Virginia's database law are more
tenuous and should not be considered persuasive precedent for North
Carolina courts. Finally, North Carolina is pioneering a revolutionary
database system that will assist criminal justice professionals in
capturing and prosecuting criminals while preserving arrestees' civil
liberties. Though the line between reasonable and unreasonable
searches may be drawn in sand, all citizens should be concerned by
the storm coming ashore that will erode civil liberties-the DNA
Database Act of 2010.
LAUREN N. HOBSON
221. Id. The state controller's initial projections assumed that only two lives would be
saved per year, contributing $2.25 million per year. APRIL 2010 QUARTERLY REPORT,
supra note 202, at 32. The state controller now estimates saving four lives for a total of $4.5
million per year. JANUARY 2011 QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 198, at 16.
222. JANUARY 2011 QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 198, at 16.
223. Id. at 38.
224. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
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